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THE COURT SHOULD NOT LET POLITICALLY DIVIDED
TIMES AFFECT ITS CHOICES AND DECISIONS
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
ABSTRACT
The Court should not let politically divided times affect its choices
or decisions. Altering the Court’s role in politically divided times
would require a definition of what qualifies as such an era and a
theory of how to act in such times. Almost every era in American
history could be deemed a politically divided time. Changing the
Court’s role in politically divided times is inconsistent with its
preeminent role: interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. This
role does not change, and should not change, in politically charged
moments. Indeed, history shows that the Court cannot know what is
likely to lessen divisiveness, and when it has tried, it has gotten it
tragically wrong.
* Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
On Friday, January 11, 2019, the Justices met in their private
conference to decide the remaining cases to take during the October
2018 Term.1 There were eight slots open on their April oral argu-
ment calendar.2 The Justices had an amazing array of cases, posing
difficult and controversial issues, to choose among.3
For example, the Court had on its January 11 conference list the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Regents of the University of
California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, concerning
whether President Trump violated the law in rescinding the De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.4 The federal
district court enjoined President Trump’s action, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.5
The January 11 conference list had a number of potential crucial
questions concerning LGBT rights. Bostock v. Clayton County and
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. raised the question of whether dis-
crimination against an employee because of sexual orientation con-
stitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of ... sex”
within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The
Circuits have split on the question of whether employment discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination in
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: A Look Back at the Supreme Court’s October
2018 Term, A.B.A. J. (July 2, 2019, 2:18 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky-some-gleanings-from-the-october-term-2018 [https://perma.cc/TGV7-LJCU]; Amy
Howe, Eight New Grants, Ginsburg Recovery from Surgery “On Track,” SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
11, 2019, 5:32 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/eight-new-grants-ginsburg-recovery-
from-surgery-on-track/ [https://perma.cc/2QPQ-P8VK].
2. Howe, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Department
of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/department-of-homeland-security-v-regents-of-
the-university-of-california/ [https://perma.cc/5KV4-JPWA].
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048
(N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018).
6. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 17-13801, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
12405, at *1 (11th Cir. May 10, 2018) (per curiam), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
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violation of federal law.7 Also, R.G. and G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission raised the relat-
ed question of whether Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
includes a person’s gender identity so as to protect people from dis-
crimination based on their transgender status.8
There were three different cases—Stockman v. Trump,9 Doe 2 v.
Trump,10 and Trump v. Karnoski11—which involved the validity of
President Trump’s Executive Order barring transgender individuals
from the military. All three federal district courts enjoined the
transgender military ban, and the Trump administration was seek-
ing Supreme Court review before any court of appeals decisions.12
The conference list also included Box v. Planned Parenthood of
Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., which involved the constitutionality of an
Indiana law prohibiting abortions performed solely because of the
race, sex, or disability of the fetus.13 The statute also requires facil-
ities to dispose of fetal remains in the same manner as other human
remains—by burial or cremation—rather than as medical waste.14
The Justices also considered whether to grant review in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York.15 This case involved
a New York City law that limits handgun owners to possessing their
guns at the address listed on their handgun licenses, with the sole
exception of transporting their guns “directly to and from” one of
approximately seven “authorized small arms range/shooting club[s],
7. Compare Bostock, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 12405, at *1-2 (upholding a precedent that
Title VII does not prohibit discharging an employee for homosexuality), with Zarda, 883 F.3d
at 112-13 (holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title VII).
8. See 884 F.3d 560, 566-67, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
9. 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 993, 1002-03 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
10. 315 F. Supp. 3d 474, 479, 486 (D.D.C. 2018).
11. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *1, *10 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 11, 2017), staying preliminary injunction, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019).
12. Stockman, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 993, 1004 (denying defendants’ motion to dissolve
preliminary injunction); Doe 2, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 479-80, 498 (denying defendants’ motion
to dissolve preliminary injunction issued in October 2017); Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at
*10 (granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction).
13. 888 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 2018).
14. IND. CODE §§ 16-34-3-4, 16-41-16-4(d), 16-41-16-5, 16-41-16-7.6 (2019).
15. 883 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
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unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried
separately.”16
The conference list also included Morris County Board of Chosen
Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Foundation and Presbyterian
Church in Morristown v. Freedom from Religion Foundation.17 The
New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Morris County,
New Jersey, violated the New Jersey Constitution when the County
provided public funds for the preservation of historic buildings for
restoration of churches.18 In 2017, in Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that a state violated free
exercise of religion when the state refused to provide parochial
schools funds for surfacing playgrounds when the same money was
available to secular private schools.19 The question is whether this
analysis extends to money for historic preservation.20
The Supreme Court took none of these cases on January 11.21
None were heard in October Term 2018.22 The conclusion is ines-
capable that the Court made a deliberate choice to stay away from
the most divisive, controversial issues. In light of the bruising con-
firmation fight over the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh, it seems
obvious that the Court decided to have a lower profile this Term.
In fact, the most high-profile, controversial cases of the term were
ones the Court had little choice but to hear. Rucho v. Common
Cause—which involved whether federal courts can hear challenges
to partisan gerrymandering—had been decided by a three-judge
federal district court.23 The Supreme Court is obligated to take such
cases when appellate review is requested.24 In Department of
Commerce v. New York—which involved whether the Commerce
Department could include a question about citizenship on the
16. Id. at 53 (quoting 38 RCNY § 5-23(a)(3)).
17. 181 A.3d 992 (N.J. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 909 (2019). I should disclose that I
was counsel for the Respondent, Freedom from Religion Foundation, in this case in the
Supreme Court.
18. Id. at 994.
19. 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
20. Freedom from Religion Found., 181 A.3d at 994.
21. See Howe, supra note 1.
22. 2018-2019 Term, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018 [https://perma.cc/Q78G-
RQNT].
23. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
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census—the government told the Court that the census forms had
to be printed by June 30, 2019, and the Court therefore took the
case even before review in the court of appeals.25
Assuming I am correct that the Justices decided to avoid divisive
issues whenever possible in October Term 2018, the Court seriously
erred. The Court abdicates its role in the system of separation of
powers when it fails to hear and decide important issues of federal
law, including constitutional questions. A crucial responsibility of
the Court is to give guidance to lower courts, to legislatures, and to
litigants as to the law. The Court does not do this when it chooses
to avoid the hard cases.
Moreover, the Court’s inaction has an unintended consequence:
the Court took many of these cases for the next term and they will
be decided in the spring of 2020, in the midst of a presidential
election campaign. The Court subsequently granted certiorari in
cases mentioned above—such as those involving DACA,26 sexual
orientation discrimination in employment,27 discrimination against
transgender individuals in employment,28 and the New York City
ordinance regulating guns outside the home.29 These cases are
scheduled to be heard in October Term 2019.30 The Court obviously
will not succeed in its quest for a lower profile.
My thesis is that the Court should not let politically divided times
affect its choices or decisions. I make three points. First, altering the
Court’s role in politically divided times would require a definition of
what qualifies as such an era and a theory of how to act in such
times. Such a definition and theory are elusive. Indeed, almost
25. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561, 2565 (2019); Erwin
Chemerinsky, How the Roberts Court Could Alter the Administrative State, A.B.A. J. (Sept.
4, 2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-the-roberts-court-
could-alter-the-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/6RAW-VH9R].
26. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
27. Bostock v. Clayton County, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139
S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
28. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
29. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
30. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2019: For the Session
Beginning November 4, 2019, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ar
gument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ Y4BU-A342];
Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2019: For the Session Beginning October 7,
2019, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/Monthly
ArgumentCalOctober2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8GX-7JS2].
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every era in American history could be deemed a politically divided
time.31 Second, changing the Court’s role in politically divided times
is inconsistent with its preeminent role: interpreting and enforcing
the Constitution.32 This role does not change, and should not
change, in politically charged moments. Third, history shows that
the Court cannot know what is likely to lessen divisiveness, and
when it has tried, it has gotten it tragically wrong.33
I, of course, do not deny that inevitably the Justices are affected
by the society in which they live. My point is that the Court should
not try to manage those times by altering its behavior because of
partisan divisions within society, even at a time like now when
there is enormous ideological polarization.
I. WHAT ARE “POLITICALLY CHARGED MOMENTS” AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT THEM?
This Symposium focuses on “The Role of Courts in Politically
Charged Moments.” The question is whether this role should change
at such times. But this raises a threshold question: What are
“politically charged moments?” If the role of the courts is different
at such times, it is essential to have a definition of when they exist.
I know of no such definition and, even if there were such a defini-
tion, I am skeptical whether it would be possible to know if it was
met at the time of the determination. I think it is very hard to
assess one’s own times. Would a politically charged moment be
determined by the closeness of the most recent presidential election?
Would it be ascertained by whether the President and Congress are
controlled by the same political party (which would mean that the
first two years of the Trump administration would not be deemed a
politically charged time)? Or is it a matter of public opinion polls on
key issues? But then what issues, and what would be the standard
for divisiveness?
 Looking back, when have there not been politically charged mo-
ments in American history? Certainly, early American history was
politically charged as reflected in the enactment of the Alien and
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.
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Sedition Acts of 1798 and the divisive presidential election of 1800,
which was decided by the House of Representatives.34 The country
was deeply divided over the issue of slavery in the nineteenth
century before the Civil War. In the years after the Civil War, there
was the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and Recon-
struction, which certainly made that time a “politically charged
moment.”35
The first part of the twentieth century saw a divisive debate over
whether the United States should participate in World War I. It also
was a time of great disagreement over the role of the government in
protecting workers and consumers; during this period of time,
known as the Lochner era, the Court struck down over 200 progres-
sive federal, state, and local laws.36 There was an intense debate
over the role of the federal judiciary.37 During the 1930s, the crisis
of the Great Depression occurred and tensions arose when the
Supreme Court struck down key New Deal legislation.38
In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the McCarthy era saw ten-
sions over the Communist threat and what should be done about it.
The 1950s and the 1960s were a time of civil rights activism and
massive resistance. The 1960s and the 1970s saw the country deeply
divided over the Vietnam War. In the 1980s, President Ronald
Reagan’s effort to remake government in a vastly more conservative
direction caused division. The 1990s saw the impeachment of Pres-
ident Bill Clinton.
The presidential election of 2000 reflected a deeply divided
country and an election effectively decided by the Supreme Court.39
34. See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3739-42, 3744-46, 3753-54, 3776-77 (1798); Creating the
United States: Election of 1800, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-
united-states/election-of-1800.html [https://perma.cc/FJU4-Q3JY].
35. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States, U.S.
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_
Johnson.htm [https://perma.cc/ASL9-5E7B].
36. See Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 1, 4-5 (2004).
37. See 2 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1-6 (Daniel S. Holt ed. 2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Debates-
Federal-Judiciary-Vol-II.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKC8-JHES].
38. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
39. Thomas E. Mann, Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, BROOKINGS (Jan.
1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/ articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-s-presidential-election/
[https://perma.cc/SN2H-H2NE]; Frank Newport, President-Elect Bush Faces Politically
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After September 11, 2001, the country was split over the invasion
of Iraq, Guantanamo, and the actions of the Bush administration in
combatting terrorism. And no one would deny the political divisions
during the Obama and Trump administrations.
My point obviously is not a detailed review of any of this history.
It just is to say that virtually any moment in American history could
have been regarded at that time as politically charged. There then
seems little point in defining a special role for the Court at these
times.
But if somehow “politically charged times” could be meaningfully
defined, and if it were possible to know when they exist, there still
would be the question of what that should mean in terms of the ju-
dicial role. Should it affect the cases the Court takes? Should it
affect how the Court decides cases? Perhaps the instinct is that the
Court should be more “minimalist” at these times, playing less of a
role and deciding matters more narrowly.40 But why assume that is
better for the country? There is an underlying assumption that the
Court should do less at politically charged moments, but why be-
lieve that?
I feel that I am the ungracious guest asked to speak at a Sympo-
sium on the role of the courts in politically charged moments and
then questioning its very premise.
II. THE COURT’S ROLE DOES NOT CHANGE IN POLITICALLY
CHARGED TIMES
Considering whether to change the role of the federal courts
inherently requires defining their role. My view is that the
preeminent purpose of the federal courts is to enforce the United
States Constitution. Legal doctrines and principles should be
directed toward allowing the federal courts to fulfill this mission,
including in politically charged moments. I believe that Chief
Justice John Marshall got it exactly right in Marbury v. Madison:
Divided Nation, but Relatively Few Americans Are Angry or Bitter over Election Outcome,
GALLUP (Dec. 18, 2000), https://news.gallup.com/poll/2200/presidentelect-bush-faces-politi
cally-divided-nation-relatively.aspx [https://perma.cc/VQE6-8YKX].
40. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT ix (1999).
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the Constitution exists to limit government, and the limits are
meaningful only if they are enforced.41 Enforcement often will not
happen without the judiciary. Therefore, the most important role of
the federal courts should be seen as enforcing the Constitution.
More generally, the very existence of federal courts embodies a
crucial choice about their role in enforcing the Constitution.42 Under
the Articles of Confederation, there were neither federal courts nor
a federal judicial power.43 Article III of the Constitution created the
Supreme Court and authorized the creation of the lower federal
courts because of a belief that the enforcement of federal law could
not be left exclusively to the state judiciaries.44 Congress created the
lower federal courts in 1789, and they have existed ever since,
because the Supreme Court by itself does not have the capacity to
review all state court decisions.45 Since their creation, federal courts
have existed, above all, to enforce federal law, and the most impor-
tant federal law is the Constitution.
Nor can we rely on voluntary compliance from the other branches
and levels of government.46 Far too often, legislators and officials
have a strong incentive not to comply with the Constitution. These
situations, which often involve the most vulnerable in society, are
where the federal judiciary is most needed.
More generally, if not for the federal courts, what is to stop the
Congress or the President from enacting a law that is unconstitu-
tional but politically expedient? What, other than the drastic
remedy of impeachment, is to stop the President from pursuing
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
42. There is an endless debate among academics, and even Justices, as to whether there
is parity between federal courts and state courts. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1977). For a review of the literature in the debate over parity,
see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988). The choice to create federal courts in 1789 reflected
a view that some matters should not be left exclusively to state courts with federal court
review only in the United States Supreme Court.
43. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE 8 (2017).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. There are those who argue that this is sufficient and that judicial review should be
eliminated. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT 254-55 (2009); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 127-28 (1999).
2020] POLITICALLY DIVIDED TIMES 981
unconstitutional policies when they are politically popular?47 And as
we saw with regard to the impeachment proceedings against Presi-
dent Trump, the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate for
removal makes this an empty threat. Often there is no one, other
than the courts, to deter wrongdoing and compensate those injured
by constitutional violations.48
Most dramatically, those without political power have nowhere to
turn except the judiciary for the protection of their constitutional
rights. The reality is that participants in the political process have
little incentive to be responsive to the constitutional rights of pris-
oners, or criminal defendants, or those who are not citizens.49
These individuals lack political power—they do not give money to
political candidates, they generally are prohibited from voting, they
are unpopular and often unsympathetic. When is the last time a
legislature acted to expand the rights of prisoners or criminal de-
fendants? In the competition for scarce dollars, legislatures have
every political incentive to spend as little as possible on prisoners.
Politicians compete to sound tough on crime, not to expand defen-
dants’ rights. Yet, how much worse might it be if politicians and
prison officials knew that no court would review the constitution-
ality of their actions?
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has a less than stellar record of
protecting these individuals’ rights, but there is no doubt that
judicial review has provided protections for criminal defendants and
dramatically improved conditions for countless prison inmates aban-
doned by the political process. Although these are obvious examples,
the nature of democracy is that the elected branches of government
are often insensitive to the rights of those who lack political
influence.50
This view of the federal judiciary derives from the purpose of the
Constitution itself. My agreement with Marbury v. Madison ulti-
mately is based on my belief that the written Constitution exists to
be the supreme law of the land and to limit what everyone in
47. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 9.
48. Id.
49. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1459,
1463 (2017).
50. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 9.
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government, at all levels, can do.51 Judicial review is based on the
premise that society is better off having an institution largely insu-
lated from majoritarian politics, the federal judiciary, give meaning
to and enforce the Constitution.
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe powerfully asked: “[W]hy
[would] a nation that rests legality on the consent of the governed
... choose to constitute its political life in terms of commitments to
an original agreement—made by the people, binding on their child-
ren, and deliberately structured so as to be difficult to change[?]”52
It is hardly original or profound to answer this question by ob-
serving that the framers deliberately made the Constitution very
difficult to change as a way of preventing tyranny of the majority
and protecting the rights of the minority from oppression by social
majorities. If the structure of government were placed in a statute,
the urge to create dictatorial powers in times of crisis might be irre-
sistible. If individual liberties were protected only by statutes, a
tyrannical government could overrule them. If terms of office were
specified in a statute rather than in the Constitution, those in power
could alter the rules to remain in office.53
Thus the Constitution represents society’s attempt to tie its own
hands, to limit its ability to fall prey to weaknesses that might harm
or undermine its most cherished values. History teaches that under
the passions of the moment, people may sacrifice even the most
basic principles of liberty and justice. The Constitution is society’s
attempt to protect itself from itself. It enumerates basic values—
regular elections, separation of powers, individual rights, equal-
ity—and makes departure very difficult. In large part, the decision
to be governed by the Constitution is animated by fear that a polit-
ical majority could gain control of government and disenfranchise
and perhaps persecute the minority. Compared to all other laws, the
Constitution is uniquely difficult to amend or alter, precisely to
ensure that the limits it sets are not easily changed.54
Accordingly, in deciding who should be the authoritative inter-
preter of the Constitution, the answer is the branch of government
51. Id. at 9-10.
52. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1988).
53. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 10.
54. Id.
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that can best enforce the Constitution’s limits against the desires of
political majorities. By this criterion, the federal judiciary is the
obvious choice. It is the institution most insulated from political
pressures.55 Article III of the Constitution provides that federal
court judges have life tenure unless impeached, and that their
salary may not be decreased during their terms of office. Unlike
legislators or the president, they never face reelection.56 Also, the
judiciary has no need to respond to those who can vote or give
money in elections.
Furthermore, the method of federal judicial selection reinforces
its antimajoritarian character. Unlike the House of Representatives,
whose members are elected at the same time, or the Senate, where
one-third of the members are chosen in each election, the Court’s
members are appointed one at a time, as vacancies arise. No single
administration is generally able to appoint a majority of the Court
or the federal judiciary. The result is that the Court reflects many
political views, not just the one that dominates at a particular
time.57
Thus the primary reason for having federal courts—the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts—is to enforce the Constitution
against the will of the majority.58 This is especially important with
regard to the protection of minorities—whether they are political,
religious, racial, or sexual orientation minorities.
This role does not change in politically charged moments.
Moreover, enforcing the Constitution is inherently likely to heighten
divisions in society. When the Court protects minorities, it often will
anger the majority by invalidating actions it has taken.59 Enforcing
separation of powers and checks and balances often will mean strik-
ing down actions that the government—and the social majority—
wants to take.60 If anything, politically charged times—assuming
they could be defined—might justify a larger, not a lesser, role for
55. Id.
56. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
57. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 10.
58. Id.
59. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101-
02 (2000).
60. Id. at 101.
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the judiciary. In these times, the political process might be least
protective of those with minority views.
The Court simply cannot perform its central missions of uphold-
ing the Constitution and protecting minorities if it refrains, or does
less, at politically divided moments. 
III. THE CAUTION OF HISTORY
I do not believe that the Court can know, at any moment in time,
what is likely to be divisive or what is likely to be healing. History
shows that when the Court has tried, it often has gotten it wrong
and made what, in hindsight, come to be regarded as tragic mis-
takes. Consider a few examples.
A. Dred Scott v. Sandford
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court faced a narrow question:
could a slave sue based on diversity of citizenship?61 Dred Scott, a
slave owned in Missouri by John Emerson, was taken into Illinois,
a free state.62 After Emerson died, Scott was owned by John
Sandford, a resident of New York.63 Scott sued Sandford in federal
court, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, and claimed
that his residence in Illinois made him a free person.64
The United States Supreme Court ruled against Scott in a de-
cision that fills over 200 pages in the United States Reports. The
Supreme Court held that slaves were not citizens and thus could not
invoke federal court diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.65 The Court
explained that when the Constitution was ratified, slaves were con-
sidered “as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privi-
leges but such as those who held the power and the Government
might choose to grant them.”66 The Court reviewed the laws that
61. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 400 (1857).
62. Id. at 431.
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. at 452.
65. Id. at 426-27.
66. Id. at 404-405.
2020] POLITICALLY DIVIDED TIMES 985
existed in 1787 and concluded that a “perpetual and impassable
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the
one which they had reduced to slavery.”67 The Court said that slaves
were not citizens, even if born in the United States, and thus could
not sue as citizens in the federal courts.68
Even though the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Scott’s suit, it went further and declared the Missouri Compro-
mise unconstitutional.69 The Supreme Court ruled that Congress
could not grant citizenship to slaves or their descendants; this would
be a taking of property from slave owners without due process or
just compensation.70 The Court concluded:
[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution.... [I]t is the opinion of the court
that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding
and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United
States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by
the Constitution, and is therefore void.71
The Court said that Scott therefore was not made free by being
taken into Illinois, and that his status on return to Missouri was to
be determined by Missouri law.
The Supreme Court undoubtedly thought that it was resolving
the controversy over slavery in Dred Scott v. Sandford. As Justice
Scalia said: Chief Justice Taney “had thought himself call[ing] the
contending sides of national controversy to end their national
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitu-
tion.”72 The decision had exactly the opposite of its intended effect.
The ruling became the focal point in the debate over slavery and, by
striking down the Missouri Compromise, the decision helped to pre-
cipitate the Civil War.73
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 411.
69. Id. at 452.
70. Id. at 450.
71. Id. at 451-52.
72. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
73. For example, the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates involved extended arguments about
the Dred Scott decision and its meaning. For an excellent discussion of this, see DAVID
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The Court clearly was reacting to an intensely politically charged
time. It thought that it could resolve the issue of slavery once and
for all. Its attempt to do so was tragically wrong and should caution
against thinking that special judicial reactions to politically charged
moments is desirable.
B. The Slaughter-House Cases
Another example of the Court trying to manage a politically
divisive time and getting it wrong was in the Slaughter-House
Cases. The issue before the Court was a narrow one: whether a
state-granted monopoly in operating a slaughterhouse violated the
recently enacted Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments.74 Rather
than resolving that limited issue, the Court saw itself as giving
broad pronouncements on the meaning of these provisions. The
Court, at the outset of its opinion, declared:
This court is thus called upon for the first time to give construc-
tion to these articles. We do not conceal from ourselves the great
responsibility which this duty devolves upon us. No questions so
far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, so profoundly
interesting to the people of this country, and so important in
their bearing upon the relations of the United States, and of the
several States to each other and to the citizens of the States and
of the United States, have been before this court during the
official life of any of its present members.... Fortunately that
history is fresh within the memory of us all, and its leading fea-
tures, as they bear upon the matter before us, free from doubt.75
The case came to the Court just seven years after the end of the
Civil War, in the midst of Reconstruction, and certainly at a polit-
ically charged moment.76 Likely as a result, the Supreme Court felt
the need to narrowly construe all of the provisions of the recently
enacted amendments.77 The Court said that the purpose of the
ZAREFSKY, LINCOLN DOUGLAS AND SLAVERY: IN THE CRUCIBLE OF PUBLIC DEBATE 51-53 (1990).
74. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 58-59 (1873).
75. Id. at 67-68.
76. See James K. Hogue, The Slaughterhouse Cases: Regulation, Reconstruction, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 CIV. WAR BOOK REV. 1, 1, 3 (2004).
77. See id. at 1-2.
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was solely to protect for-
mer slaves.78 Justice Miller wrote that:
[t]he most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of
purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times
... [that there was] one pervading purpose found in them all[:] ...
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made free-
man and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.79
The Court proceeded to interpret each provision very narrowly
and solely to achieve this limited goal. For example, the Court said
that the Equal Protection Clause only was meant to protect blacks
and offered the prediction that “[w]e doubt very much whether any
action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision.”80
The Court rejected the notion of substantive due process entirely.
Substantive due process is the principle that the government’s dep-
rivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property must be justified by a
sufficient purpose.81 The Court declared, with no elaboration or ex-
planation, that
it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision
that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the
restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of
their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a depri-
vation of property within the meaning of that provision.82
Perhaps most importantly, the Court interpreted the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in a way that essentially read that provision
out of the Constitution.83 Specifically, the Court held that the
78. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
79. Id. at 67, 71.
80. Id. at 81.
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20
(1997).
82. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80-81.
83. See id. at 74-77.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause was not meant to protect indi-
viduals from state government actions and was not meant to be a
basis for federal courts to invalidate state laws.84 Justice Miller
wrote:
[S]uch a construction ... would constitute this court a perpetual
censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of
their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not
approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the
time of the adoption of this amendment.... We are convinced that
no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed
these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which
ratified them.85
Indeed, the Court was explicit that “privileges and immunities ...
are left to the State governments for security and protection, and
not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal
government.”86 The Privileges and Immunities Clause was rendered
a nullity by the Slaughter-House Cases, and it largely has been ever
since.87 Professor Edward Corwin remarked that “[u]nique among
constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the distinction of having been
rendered a ‘practical nullity’ by a single decision of the Supreme
Court rendered within five years after its ratification.”88
Reacting to a politically charged moment, the Court chose to rule
very broadly when it could have narrowly interpreted the newly
enacted amendments. The result was to greatly restrict, and even
nullify, many of these provisions.
C. Naim v. Naim
Dred Scott v. Sandford and the Slaughter-House Cases are exam-
ples of the Supreme Court reacting to politically charged moments
84. See id. at 77-78.
85. Id. at 78.
86. Id.
87. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953).
88. Id.
2020] POLITICALLY DIVIDED TIMES 989
by doing too much. Naim v. Naim shows the dangers of the Court
reacting to politically divisive times by doing too little.
 From the beginning of American history, many states had anti-
miscegenation laws. It was not until 1967, 180 years into American
history and almost exactly a century after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that the Court in Loving v. Virginia finally
declared laws prohibiting interracial marriage unconstitutional.89
Loving did not come until thirteen years after Brown v. Board of
Education and not until after Congress had passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.90
The Court had the opportunity to invalidate antimiscegenation
laws much earlier in Naim v. Naim in 1956.91 The case involved a
Chinese man and a white woman.92 They had been married in North
Carolina.93 She sought to have the marriage annulled in Virginia on
the grounds of the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924,94 the same
law invalidated in Loving.95 The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the
Virginia law96 and the United States Supreme Court denied
review.97 The United States Supreme Court declared: “The decision
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia of January 18, 1956 ...
leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal question.”98 In
other words, the Court said that there was no substantial federal
question presented by a state law prohibiting interracial marriage.
That, of course, was nonsense in 1956, as it was over a decade
later in 1967. The case presented a major issue with regard to equal
protection; it was the very issue that the Court resolved in Loving
v. Virginia a decade later. The Court had no hesitation then in rec-
ognizing the very important federal question presented. Indeed, the
89. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Loving v. Virginia: A Triumph and
a Failure of the Supreme Court, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 259, 264 (2018).
90. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 264; see Jim Crow to Civil Rights in Virginia, VA.
MUSEUM OF HIST. & CULTURE (2019), https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-and-
resources/virginia-history-explorer/jim-crow-civil-rights-virginia [https://perma.cc/79JP-
QGF3].
91. 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
92. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Va. 1955).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 750-51.
95. See 388 U.S. at 2, 4.
96. See Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756.
97. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
98. Id.
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Court already had declared in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma that
marriage is “one of the basic civil rights.”99 The denial of equal pro-
tection and the racism of the Virginia law was apparent from its
very title: The Racial Integrity Act.
Quite importantly, the case arose under the Supreme Court’s
mandatory jurisdiction. The Court was obligated to take the case
under the jurisdictional statutes that existed at the time.100 The
Court could not simply deny certiorari; it had to declare the fiction
of the lack of a substantial federal question.
The Court simply did not want to deal with the issue.101 Justice
Tom Clark has been widely attributed as saying “[o]ne bombshell at
a time is enough.”102 The Court felt that the country was not ready
for it to declare unconstitutional laws prohibiting interracial mar-
riage.103 It was reacting to its perception of what was a politically
divisive time over race by choosing to avoid a constitutional question
of great significance.
But if one thinks that it was unimaginable for a court to declare
an antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional in 1956, it is impor-
tant to remember that the California Supreme Court did exactly
that eight years earlier.104 In declaring unconstitutional a long-
standing California law prohibiting interracial marriage, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that the statute violated the equal
protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution by
impairing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone
and by arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against certain
racial groups.105 The United States Supreme Court could have—and
should have—done the same thing in Naim v. Naim.
By not doing this, the Court made a huge mistake in not declaring
the Virginia law unconstitutional in 1956 when the issue was before
it in Naim v. Naim.106
99. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 264-65; see 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
100. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265; see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004).
101. See KLARMAN, supra note 100, at 321.
102. Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525, 526 (2012).
103. See KLARMAN, supra note 100, at 321.
104. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265 (quoting Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 731-32 (1948)).
105. Id.; Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 731-32.
106. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265; see Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
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First, this was the Court abdicating its proper role. The Court’s
role was to decide whether the Virginia law prohibiting interracial
marriage denied equal protection, not to determine whether it would
please the country or upset people. The importance of the issue
made it incumbent on the Court to decide the question presented—
and to declare the Virginia law unconstitutional as a clear denial of
equal protection.107 As Professor Richard Delgado observed: “For if
whites and nonwhites cannot marry and make lives together, what
does it matter if they can attend the same movie theater or swim in
the same public pool? The prohibition of intermarriage would seem
to violate Brown’s mandate as glaringly as any other.”108 I strongly
disagree with those who praise the “passive virtues” of the Court
avoiding difficult issues.109
As discussed in Part II, the Court’s preeminent role is to enforce
the Constitution and if a law violates equal protection to say so,
whatever the public reaction.110 The Court abandons this role when
it tailors its review and rulings to avoid controversy in politically
charged moments.
Second, I am skeptical that invalidating the Virginia law in Naim
v. Naim would have intensified the massive resistance to the Court’s
desegregation orders. The reality is that Southern states did every-
thing they possibly could to avoid desegregation. To be sure, many
Southerners would have seen invalidating laws prohibiting inter-
racial marriages as another blow to their segregationist beliefs.111
Also, there was an important difference between a decision striking
down the Virginia law and the rulings about school desegregation.112
If a person opposed interracial marriage, he or she could choose not
to marry someone of a different race. But school desegregation
orders were involuntary.113 I think this helps to explain why there
was such relatively quick acceptance of marriage equality for gays
and lesbians. Allowing gays and lesbians to marry did not impose
107. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265; see Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Va. 1955).
108. Delgado, supra note 102, at 525.
109. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265. This phrase comes from a famous law review
article, Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1961).
110. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 265; see supra Part II.
111. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 266; see KLARMAN, supra note 100, at 320-21.
112. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 266.
113. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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the slightest burden on anyone else.114 As I often remarked in ar-
guing for marriage equality: if someone does not like same-sex
marriage, they should not marry someone of the same sex. But it
was not a reason to keep others from doing so.
Third, enormous positive benefits would have been gained if the
Court had declared the Virginia law unconstitutional in Naim v.
Naim. The Court would have provided what was missing in Brown:
a clear statement that laws based on an assumption of racial supe-
riority violate equal protection. There also would have been great
social benefits to this.115 As Professor Delgado observed:
If they were a devoted couple, they would be forced to live to-
gether without the benefit of marriage, to conceal their relation-
ship from others much of the time, and, probably, refrain from
having children. They were not the only ones to lose out. Society
did, as well. It missed the opportunity to see twelve years worth
of mixed-race couples and their children at schools, on side-
walks, in markets, and in the many ordinary interactions of life.
It lost the opportunity, multiplied many times, to see how nor-
mal interracial friendship can be.116
I thus come to the same conclusion as Professor Delgado: Naim
v. Naim was not a prudent exercise in judicial discretion, but a
timid act that misjudged the judicial role. Emanating from a court
that ought to be in the business of enforcing the Constitution—and
not waiting until it is safe or convenient to do so—it was a jurispru-
dential error.117 I believe that it was an error entirely borne of the
Court trying to manage a politically charged moment.
Dred Scott, the Slaughter-House Cases, and Naim v. Naim all
illustrate the great dangers when the Court tries to manage
politically charged moments. The Court simply cannot know enough
about the reaction at the time or the course of history to ensure that
it will make the “right” choices. By contrast, I think of instances
where the Court did not let the political tensions of the time affect
its decisions. The most obvious example is Brown v. Board of
114. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 266.
115. Id.; see Delgado, supra note 102, at 527.
116. Delgado, supra note 102, at 527; see Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 266.
117. Chemerinsky, supra note 89, at 266; see Delgado, supra note 102, at 531.
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Education.118 The Court’s decision was as divisive as any in
American history, unleashing massive resistance to desegrega-
tion.119 But it also is regarded as one of the Court’s shining moments
when the Court fulfilled its central role of enforcing the Constitution
and protecting minorities.120 The United States would have been far
worse off if the Court had avoided the issue because it was inher-
ently highly controversial.
Another example is the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times
Co. v. United States.121 The New York Times, and then the Washing-
ton Post, published excerpts from a top secret, 47-volume Defense
Department history of the Vietnam War.122 The United States
government sought federal court injunctions precluding publication
on national security grounds.123 The federal district courts refused
to issue such orders.124 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed,125 while the Second Circuit remanded and con-
tinued the stay.126 The case proceeded quickly: just eighteen days
elapsed from the first article in The New York Times until the
decision in the Supreme Court.127 The Supreme Court held, by a 6-
to-3 margin, that a court order stopping publication violated the
First Amendment.128
The case certainly came at a politically charged time. The
Vietnam War was deeply divisive and enormously controversial.
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. See The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP (2019),
https://www.naacpldf.org/ldf-celebrates-60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education/southern-
manifesto-massive-resistance-brown/ [https://perma.cc/SFF4-QCFG].
120. See Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and Its Impact on the
Supreme Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 9 (1992).
121. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
122. See John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Papers, 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 341, 355 (1993); Douglas Martin, Gerald Gold, Editor on the Pentagon Papers,
Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/business/
media/gerald-gold-times-editor-on-the-pentagon-papers-is-dead-at-85.html [https://perma.cc/
RJ5L-CTYH].
123. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
124. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
125. See United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
126. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
127. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 713; Sims, supra note 122, at 355.
128. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714, 752.
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Yet, in hindsight, the Pentagon Papers case is regarded as a huge
triumph for the First Amendment and the Constitution.129
Of course, finally, it should be noted that sometimes the Court
cannot anticipate when its decisions will be divisive. Roe v. Wade
was a 7-2 decision.130 It did not draw substantial political attention
and opposition until 1980, when Republicans sought to elicit support
from Evangelical voters.131
My point is that history shows that the Court engages in a fool’s
errand when it tries to adapt its decisions to manage politically
charged moments. The Court is in no position to know what to do or
what the long-term effects of its actions will be. Sometimes the
Court’s decisions will lessen social divisions, sometimes exacerbate
them. But even if the Court could know the consequences in hand-
ing down decisions (and it cannot), that should not affect what cases
it takes or how it decides them.
CONCLUSION
This Symposium asks the question of what the role of the courts
should be in politically charged moments. My answer is that its pre-
eminent role should be the exact same at all times: enforcing the
Constitution. The Court’s choices and decisions should not be
altered by a desire to react to a politically divided time. Undoubt-
edly, sometimes the Court will exacerbate social tensions and
sometimes it will lessen them. The reality is that the Court cannot
effectively manage politically charged moments—even if they could
be defined—and should not try. It should take and decide cases
solely based on its best view of the law.
129. See Sims, supra note 122, at 350.
130. 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
131. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2079 (2011).
